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INTRODUCTION
"Rules of origin" are those laws, regulations, and prac-
tices that govern the determination of the country of origin of
an imported product. These rules have become increasingly
important in recent years with the growth of import quotas,
rather than tariffs, as a primary form of protection from im-
ports for domestic producers, and with the growth of tariff
schemes that prefer imports from certain countries to those
from others.
Traditionally, in the United States, country of origin dis-
putes have been concerned with two major issues: (1) whether
operations performed on an imported product by a manufac-
turer substantially transform it into a product of the United
States, and thereby render it exempt from the country of ori-
gin marking requirements of the Tariff Act; and (2) whether an
imported product that undergoes processing in more than one
foreign country, to which different rates of duty apply, is the
product of the country with the higher or the lower duty both
for marking and for duty assessment purposes.
While these problems remain very important ones, the is-
sues with which country of origin determinations are con-
cerned today are far more extensive. These determinations
are part of the test for eligibility for duty-free treatment under
the Generalized System of Preferences and the Caribbean Ba-
sin Initiative, as well as the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area, and
for products of the insular possessions of the United States.
They are an important factor in establishing the dutiable status
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of American goods exported for further processing or assem-
bly that subsequently are re-imported. They are relevant to a
determination of an exported product's eligibility for duty
drawback. And they are important in establishing an article's
status as a U.S. product for government procurement pur-
poses.
But a major reason for the increasing importance of coun-
try of origin determinations is, in a word, quotas. An increas-
ing amount of merchandise imported into the United States is
subject to country-specific import quotas, including virtually
all steel, all textile, and all manufactured dairy product im-
ports. A determination of the country of origin of these im-
ports is tantamount to a determination of the country quota to
which they will be charged. And, depending upon the availa-
bility of quota from that country, this can be a determination of
whether the articles may be imported at all. Increasingly,
country of origin determinations are being made in ways that
limit imports, or subject them to higher duties. Rules of origin
are becoming rules of restriction.
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the ba-
sic United States rule of origin, the "substantial transforma-
tion" test, and its application to the various country of origin
determinations required by U.S. law. Part II examines the ap-
plication of the substantial transformation test to imports that
compete with two politically powerful domestic industries, tex-
tiles and steel. Part III surveys the requirements for marking
goods.
I. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN DETERMINATION
A. The "Substantial Transformation" Test
The legal test employed in the United States to determine
country of origin is one of "substantial transformation." A
person who "substantially transforms" an imported article is
not required to mark that article with the name of a foreign
country; an article that undergoes processing in two or more
foreign countries is the product of the country in which it last
underwent a "substantial transformation." "[A] substantial
transformation occurs," said a United States Court of Appeals,
"when an article emerges from a manufacturing process with a
name, character, or use which differs from those of the original
1987]
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material subjected to the process. '
"Name, character, or use"-when general formulae of this
nature are applied to specific circumstances, inconsistencies
usually arise and arbitrary lines frequently are drawn. This has
occurred in the application of the substantial transformation
test. But problems of this kind are not the only ones that have
arisen. Another significant problem results from the fact that
the definitions of the term "substantial transformation" that
appear in regulations and rulings of the Customs Service, and
in court decisions, differ slightly from one substantive legal
area to another: a "transformation" apparently may be "sub-
stantial" enough for one purpose but not for another. Some
substantial transformations, the United States Customs Service
says, sometimes must be more "substantial" than others.
The differences that have arisen in the definition of the
term "substantial transformation" appear to be more the re-
sult of inattention or accident than of any purposeful scheme.
However, they have bred confusion in the law and have aided
restrictionist interpretations by the Customs Service, which has
sometimes justified determinations in one area by reference to
principles enunciated in a different area, and at other times has
dismissed with little or no comment attempts to rely on princi-
ples in one area as the basis for determinations in another.
The only consistency is a policy that results either in higher
duties or in fewer imports. This will become evident in the
course of a survey of the variety of contexts in which country of
origin determinations apply in the administration of the cus-
toms laws.
B. Section 304 and the "Ultimate Purchaser"
Section 304 of the Tariff Act, the "marking statute," re-
quires that an imported article, or its container, be marked in a
manner that will inform the "ultimate purchaser" in the United
States of its country of origin.' The "ultimate purchaser" gen-
1. Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982). "[T]he primary purpose of the country-of-origin
marking statute," said the Court of International Trade, "is to 'mark the goods so
that at the time of purchase the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where the goods
were produced, be able to buy or refuse to buy them, if such marking should influ-
ence his will.' (Congress, of course, had in mind a consumer preference for Ameri-
can made goods.)" National Juice Prods. Ass'n v. United States, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
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erally is the last person in the United States who receives the
article in the form in which it was imported.' Thus, if the arti-
cle is to be sold at retail in its imported form, the retail cus-
tomer is the "ultimate purchaser." But if the imported article
is to undergo further processing in the United States, the
processor will be the "ultimate purchaser"-provided the pro-
cess, in the words of the Customs Regulations, "results in a
substantial transformation of the article, even though the pro-
cess may not result in a new or different article." 4 If the manu-
facturing process is merely a minor one that leaves the identity
of the imported article intact, the regulations continue, the
person who obtains the article after the processing will be re-
garded as the "ultimate purchaser." 5
By providing that a substantial transformation can occur
without the production of a "new or different" article, the reg-
ulation highlights the definitional problem, for it departs from
the language of the fundamental court decision dealing with
the subject, the unanimous 1908 Supreme Court decision in
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States:
Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not man-
ufacture .... [S]omething more is necessary .... There
must be transformation; a new. and different article must emerge,
"having a distinctive name, character or use." 6
While Anheuser-Busch dealt with duty drawback and not
with country of origin marking, it is not clear what policy
grounds would justify a distinction between a substantial trans-
formation that does not result in a "new or different" article
for marking purposes and a transformation that produces an
article that is both "new and different" for drawback purposes.7
Moreover, the Customs Service itself confuses the issue else-
where in its regulations when it exempts from marking re-
quirements at the time of importation articles intended for
substantial change by manufacture in the United States:
1921, 1930 n. 14 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). "The purpose of the marking requirements
is to enable the ultimate purchaser to decide whether to buy goods with knowledge of
the goods' country of origin." C.S.D. 80-21, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 758, 760 (1979).
3. 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(d) (1987).
4. Id. § 134.1(d)(1).
5. Id. § 134.1(d)(2).
6. 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) (emphasis added).
7. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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An article used in the United States in manufacture which
results in an article having a name, character, or use differing
from that of the imported article, will be within the principle of
the decision in the case of United States v. Gibson-Thorn-
sen Co., Inc., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (C.A.D. 98). Under this prin-
ciple, the manufacturer or processor in the United States
who converts or combines the imported article into the dif-
ferent article will be considered the "ultimate purchaser" of
the imported article .... 8
Perhaps a metaphysician can make sense of the terminol-
ogy used, but even that is doubtful. In any event, it may be
described as needlessly-if not hopelessly--confusing. Con-
crete examples of the application by courts of these words to
the facts of specific cases involving the marking statute may
serve to give them some content:
*A manufacturer of toothbrushes and hair brushes was de-
termined to be the ultimate purchaser of toothbrush handles
and wooden brush blocks to which the manufacturer attached
bristles. 9 The imported items, the court said, "are mere mater-
ials to be used in the United States in the manufacture of new
articles-toothbrushes and hair brushes, respectively."' 0
*An importer of steel forgings who converts them to
flanges and fittings is the ultimate purchaser because conver-
sion substantially transforms "producers' goods," incapable of
being used by the consumer in their imported state, into "con-
sumers goods.""
OA shoe manufacturer who attaches outsoles to imported
shoe uppers does not substantially transform the uppers; ac-
cordingly, the manufacturer is not the ultimate purchaser of
the uppers, and the completed shoe is not exempt from coun-
try of origin marking.'"
*Racetrack patrons who were given umbrellas upon pay-
ment of an admission fee were the ultimate purchasers of the
umbrellas, not the racetrack itself, which purchased and dis-
8. 19 C.F.R. § 134.35 (1987) (emphasis added).
9. United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (1940).
10. Id. at 273.
11. Midwood Indus., Inc. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 499 (1970).
12. Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 220, 542 F. Supp. 1026
(1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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tributed them.' 3 Therefore, it was not enough that the mark-
ing be adequate to notify the track of the foreign origin of the
umbrellas; the marking must notify the patrons as well. 4
*Manufacturers of frozen concentrated orange juice or re-
constituted orange juice do not substantially transform im-
ported manufacturing grade orange juice concentrate, and
therefore are not the ultimate purchasers. Country of origin
marking requirements, accordingly, apply to the repacked
products that contain foreign manufacturing concentrate.' 5
C. Rules of Preference
The Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), estab-
lished in 1974,16 and the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"),
begun in 1983,17 provide duty-free treatment to imports of
13. Pabrini, Inc. v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
14. Id.
15. NationalJuice Prods. Ass'n v. United States, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1921 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986). These court decisions reflect instances in which private parties pro-
tested the administrative rulings of the Customs Service or its parent agency, the
Department of the Treasury. Numerous administrative rulings have not been ap-
pealed. Some examples will fill in more of the picture:
*Steel coils from Japan are not substantially transformed in Canada by being slit
in width or flattened and slit into plates or sheets; consequently, the product, when
imported from Canada into the United States, must be marked "Japan." C.S.D. 79-
206, 13 Cust. B. & Dec. 1279 (1978).
*A manufacturer of ceiling fans does not substantially transform imported com-
ponents by assembling and combining them into fans, and therefore the fans must be
marked with the name of the foreign country of origin. C.S.D. 80-111, 14 Cust. B. &
Dec. 898 (1979).
*Pre-cut leather from the United States is substantially transformed when assem-
bled into leather harnesses in Haiti; therefore, the harnesses must be marked with
Haiti as the country of origin. C.S.D. 80-113, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 901 (1979).
*A manufacturer of asbestos cement pipe for water and sewer applications sub-
stantially transforms imported raw asbestos cement tubes, and, therefore, is the ulti-
mate purchaser of the imported product. C.S.D. 80-114, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 904
(1979).
eSilver plating substantially transforms imported steel cutlery. C.S.D. 80-237,
14 Cust. B. & Dec. 1150 (1980).
eAssembly in the United States of integrated circuits from imported semiconduc-
tor chips constitutes a substantial transformation. C.S.D. 80-227, 14 Cust. B. & Dec.
1133 (1980).
eProgramming an EPROM (erasable programmable read only memory) semi-
conductor substantially transforms the article into a product of the country where the
programming takes place. C.S.D. 84-85, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 1044 (1984).
16. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1978, 2066-71 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2461-2466 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
17. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. II, subtit. A,
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products from developing countries when the preferential cri-
teria of the laws are met. To determine whether an article is a
product of an eligible developing country, a country of origin
determination must be made. When an article is totally the
product of the developing country, the determination presents
no problem. But when an article is produced in a developing
country from imported raw material, the rules of preference
require more than a substantial transformation. They require,
in addition, that a minimum amount of economic activity occur
in the developing country before the preference will be
granted. Thus, if a producer in a developing country substan-
tially transforms imported raw material, the finished article is a
product of that country for purposes of country of origin mark-
ing. However, the article does not qualify for the preference
unless the process of substantial transformation involved the
required amount of economic activity in the developing coun-
try. Similar rules apply in the case of the two other prefer-
ences, that conferred upon the insular possessions of the
United States, and that granted to products of Israel pursuant
to the Free Trade Area between Israel and the United States.
1. Generalized System of Preferences
To be eligible for duty-free treatment under GSP, an arti-
cle must be imported directly from the beneficiary developing
country ("BDC"), and the sum of the cost of materials pro-
duced in the BDC plus the direct cost of processing there must
equal at least 35% of the appraised value of the article at the
time of its entry into the United States."8 This statutory re-
quirement-that the sum of the costs of the materials plus the
costs of processing must total at least 35% of the article's
value-applies in addition to the requirement that imported
raw materials be substantially transformed in the BDC. Sub-
stantial transformation can occur, Congress recognized, as a
result of processing that adds less than 35% to the value of an
article. The 35% minimum is required, Congress said, "to as-
sure that, to the maximum extent possible, the preferences
provide benefits to developing countries without stimulating
97 Star. 369, 384-95 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2706 (West Supp.
1987)).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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the development of 'pass-through' operations the major bene-
fit of which accrues to enterprises in developed countries. "19
The presence of the 35% requirement has led to the develop-
ment of a "dual substantial transformation" test that may assist
BDCs in obtaining eligibility for the preference.
The term "dual substantial transformation" refers to an
intermediate step in the processing of raw material imported
into the BDC. If the imported raw material is substantially
transformed in the BDC into an intermediate product that is
itself a new article, and if that new article in turn is substan-
tially transformed into the eligible article, the intermediate
product becomes a product of the BDC by virtue of its substan-
tial transformation in the BDC - and its total value is counted
toward the required 35%.20
An example will illustrate how dual substantial transfor-
mation works. In Torrington Co. v. United States,21 sewing
machine needles, an eligible article, were exported to the
United States from Portugal, then a BDC. The needles were
manufactured in Portugal from imported wire. Therefore, the
value of the wire-a non-Portuguese product-could not count
toward the 35% requirement. The processing operations in
Portugal added less than 35% to the value of the exported
needles. Thus, at first glance, it would seem that the sum of
Portuguese materials (zero) plus Portuguese processing to-
talled less than the required 35%.
But GSP eligibility was granted because the court found a
dual substantial transformation: the first was the processing of
the imported wire into "needle blanks"; the second was the
processing of the needle blanks into needles. Because the nee-
dle blanks were produced in Portugal by the substantial trans-
formation of imported wire, they were considered to be Portu-
guese materials-and the total value of the needle blanks was
included in determining the value of the needles produced in
Portugal. By this analysis, the sum of the costs of Portuguese
materials (needle blanks) plus their Portuguese processing into
needles equalled 100% of the value of the needles.
19. H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1973).
20. See 19 C.F.R. § 10.177(a)(2) (1987).
21. 596 F. Supp. 1083 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff d, 764 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
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Since both courts in Torrington in fact found two substan-
tial transformations, their results legally are correct. The ma-
jor dispute in the case centered on the processes and products
themselves, and not on the law. However, the opinions of both
the Court of International Trade ("CIT") and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") contain dicta that are
misleading, if not erroneous. They imply that a dual substan-
tial transformation is required in every case if duty-free treat-
ment is to be granted. Thus, they would appear to deny eligi-
bility in a situation where a single substantial transformation
occurs in a process that adds at least 35% to the value of the
article. In such a case, by definition, the sum of BDC materials
(0%) plus processing (35%) equals 35%. If the process which
adds 35% to the value of the article also involves a substantial
transformation, the statutory requirements for eligibility are
met.22 Dual transformation is needed only if the value of the
materials is required to meet the 35% test-which was the case
in Torrington.25 Yet the CIT stated:
[A]bsent such a dual requirement, the GSP's goal of indus-
trialization, diversification, and economic progression for
underdeveloped nations could be frustrated. For example,
a BDC could import eligible items, merely decorate or as-
semble these items and thereby satisfy the 35 percent value-
added requirement since these direct costs of processing
operations would be includable in the calculation. In this
manner, BDC's could become mere conduits for the mer-
chandise of developed countries.24
In this analysis, the court completely ignored the fact that,
in addition to adding at least 35% to the value of the article,
the processing in the BDC substantially transforms the im-
ported raw materials into a new and different article of com-
merce. If decoration or assembly does not amount to a sub-
22. See 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(2), which provides, in relevant part, that duty-free
treatment shall be provided:
If the sum of (A) the cost or value of the materials produced in the benefici-
ary developing country... plus (B) the direct costs of processing operations
performed in such beneficiary developing country ... is not less than 35
percent of the appraised value of such article at the time of its entry into the
customs territory of the United States.
Id.
23. See 596 F. Supp. at 1085.
24. Id. at 1086.
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stantial transformation, then it would not matter how much
value is added by the process. The CAFC, unfortunately, fell
into the same trap:
In the absence of a dual transformation requirement, devel-
oped countries could establish a BDC as a base to complete
manufacture of goods which have already undergone exten-
sive processing. The single substantial transformation
would qualify the resulting article for GSP treatment, with
the non-BDC country reaping the benefit of duty-free treat-
ment for goods which it essentially produced.2 5
Here, too, the court overlooked the fact that so long as
imported raw materials are substantially transformed by an op-
eration that adds 35% or more to their value, for GSP pur-
poses they no longer are goods that a non-BDC country "es-
sentially produced." Indeed, the CAFC's reasoning turns the
statute's 35% requirement into a 100% requirement. This fol-
lows because, of course, all of the relevant processing-I00%
of it-occurs in the BDC. Assuming that this processing effects
a substantial transformation, the question is whether it alone
amounts to 35% of the value of the article. To require in addi-
tion that the raw materials be a product of the BDC, either by
origin or by substantial transformation, is to require that 100%
of the article-materials plus processing-be attributable to
the BDC. What role then does the 35% requirement play?
The dicta of both courts would read the 35% requirement out
of the law, ignoring the statutory scheme that permits up to
65% of the value of an eligible article to be attributable to a
non-BDC country. That both courts misconstrued this point is
made clear not only from the language and logic of the GSP,
but also from the legislative history of the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative.
2. Caribbean Basin Initiative
The Caribbean Basin Initiative was implemented by the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, which authorized the
President to designate twenty-seven Central American and
Caribbean nations as eligible to receive duty-free treatment for
their exports to the United States through September 30,
25. 764 F.2d at 1568.
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1995.26 The CBI rule of origin is comparable but not identical
to the GSP rule of origin. The differences, however, do not
affect the question of dual substantial transformation.
Under CBI, as under GSP, no problem arises when an arti-
cle is totally the product of a CBI country. Under CBI, as
under GSP, the 35% test is employed when imported raw
materials are substantially transformed in the CBI country;
however, the 35% test for CBI is slightly different from the
35% test for GSP. While CBI permits the cumulation of value
added among all CBI beneficiary countries to reach the re-
quired 35 percent,27 GSP permits cumulation only among
members of a free trade association such as the ASEAN na-
tions.28 Value added in Puerto Rico and in the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands counts as value added by a beneficiary country under
CBI, but not under GSP.2 9 Finally, if U.S. raw materials are
substantially transformed in a CBI country, up to 20% of their
value may be included in determining whether the 35% re-
quirement is met;30 there is no such provision in GSP.
Another important difference between GSP and CBI is re-
lated to the permitted cumulation of value added by eligible
countries other than the country from which the product is ex-
ported: this is the "direct export" requirement. Under GSP,
in order to qualify for the preference, the eligible article must
be imported directly from the BDC for which the preference is
granted.3 1 Limited exceptions apply only to well-documented
transshipment through third countries and to narrowly defined
free trade zone operations.32 And, of course, the 35% value
must be satisfied totally from the materials and processing at-
tributable to the single BDC.33 Under CBI, the article may be
26. See supra note 17.
27. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(1)(West Supp. 1987).
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(2). ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Na-
tions, consists of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
19 U.S.C. § 1202 gen. headnote 3(e)(v)(A) (Supp. III 1985). Other associations of
countries treated as one for GSP purposes are the members of the Cartagena Agree-
ment (Andean Group), consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Vene-
zuela; and the thirteen member countries of the Caribbean Common Market (CAR-
ICOM). Id.
29. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(1).
30. Id.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(1).(2).
32. See 19 C.F.R. § 10.175 (1987).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(2).
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imported directly from any beneficiary country, not necessarily
the one for which the benefit is granted. s4 This difference fa-
cilitates the cumulation of value among countries eligible for
CBI benefits.
The CBI regulations explicitly provide-contrary to the
dicta of the Torrington cases-that a single substantial transfor-
mation will suffice, if the direct costs attributable to that trans-
formation represent at least 35% of the appraised value of the
imported article.3 5 The legislative history makes clear that the
country of origin criteria of the CBI parallel those intended,
but not made explicit, for GSP: "Section 103(a) [19 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a)] expressly defines rules of origin and conforms them
to the GSP system .... This language was not included in the
GSP legislation, but was understood in this manner and has
been consistently so interpreted.13 6
Moreover, in summarizing the eligibility requirements of
CBI, the House Report leaves no doubt that a single substan-
tial transformation that adds at least 35% to the value of the
transformed article will suffice.3 7 In sum, the dicta of the two
Torrington courts notwithstanding, it seems clear that a single
substantial transformation that adds at least 35% to the value
of an article should be sufficient to permit duty-free treatment
for purposes of both GSP and CBI.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1).
35. 19 C.F.R. § 10.196(a) (1987). Example 2 to this regulation provides:
A raw, perishable skin of an animal grown in a non-beneficiary country is
sent to a beneficiary country where it is tanned to create nonperishable
"crust leather." The tanned skin is then imported directly into the U.S.
Although the tanned skin represents a new or different article of commerce
produced in a beneficiary country within the meaning of § 10.195(a), the
cost or value of the raw skin may not be counted toward the 35 percent
value requirement because (1) the tanned material of which the imported
article is composed is not wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of a
beneficiary country and (2) the tanning operation creates the imported arti-
cle itself rather than [an] intermediate article which is then used in the bene-
ficiary country in the production or manufacture of an article imported into
the U.S. The tanned skin would be eligible for duty-free treatment only if the direct
costs attributable to the tanning operation represent at least 35 percent of the appraised
value of the imported article.
19 C.F.R. § 10.196(a) example 2 (emphasis added).
36. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983).
37. "To be eligible for duty-free treatment under CB!, an article must meet
three basic tests under the rule-of-origin requirements: (1) direct importation; (2) 35
percent minimum local content; and (3) a product wholly of the country or 'substan-
tially transformed' into a new or different article." Id. at 12.
1987]
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3. Products of the Insular Possessions
The United States has traditionally granted preferential
38treatment to imports from its insular possessions. Prior to
the CBI, products of the insular possessions were admitted
duty-free if no more than 50% of their value was attributable
to foreign content.39 To maintain the preference, the CBI
modified the preferential rules of origin that apply to the insu-
lar possessions. 40 Thus, for the insular possessions too, sub-
stantial transformation alone is not enough. As with GSP and
CBI, specified value must be added.
The CBI relaxes this preferential rule of origin in two
ways: first, it provides that articles imported from the insular
possessions are afforded duty treatment "no less favorable"
than the treatment afforded articles from Caribbean countries
under the CBI, thereby placing the insular possessions at least
on a par with the CBI countries;4' second, it provides that the
50%-foreign-content-permitted rule of origin will be modified
to a 70%-foreign-content-permitted rule for articles eligible
for duty-free treatment under CBI, thereby giving the insular
possessions an overall 5% advantage compared to CBI coun-
tries. 42 For articles not eligible for duty-free treatment under
the CBI, the insular possessions retain their entitlement to
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 gen. headnote 3(a) (Supp. II 1985). The insular posses-
sions include Guam, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island,
and American Samoa. 19 C.F.R. § 7.8 n.5 (1987). They also include the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying
text.
39. Watches and watch movements were admitted duty free if their foreign con-
tent did not exceed 70%. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 gen. headnote 3(a) (Supp. III 1985).
40. H.R. REP. No. 266, supra note 36, at 22-24; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
98TH CONG., IST SESS., EXPLANATION OF COMMITrEE AMENDMENT To H.R. 2973, at 33
(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter H.R. 2973 SENATE FINANCE EXPLANATION].
41. General Headnote 3(a) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States provides:
(iv) Subject to the provisions in Section 213 of the Caribbean Basin Eco-
nomic Recovery Act, articles which are imported from insular possessions of
the United States shall receive duty treatment no less favorable than the
treatment afforded such articles when they are imported from a beneficiary
country under such Act.
19 U.S.C. § 1202 gen. headnote 3(a)(iv) (Supp. I 1985) (citations omitted). The
General Headnotes and Rules of Interpretation of the Tariff Schedules are no longer
carried in the United States Code Annotated. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2702(d) (West Supp.
1987).
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 gen. headnote 3(a)(i) (Supp. III 1985).
RULES OF ORIGIN
duty-free treatment under the 50% rule.43
4. United States-Israel Free Trade Area
In 1985, Congress implemented the United States-Israel
Free Trade Area, which provides for duty-free treatment in
each country for the products of the other." The rules of ori-
gin for this duty-free treatment parallel those of the CBI: in
order for the United States to grant duty-free treatment, the
sum of the cost of the materials produced in Israel, plus the
direct cost of processing operations performed there, may not
be less than 35% of the appraised value of the merchandise at
the time it is entered in the United States.45 The cost or value
of materials produced in the United States may account for up
to 15% of the appraised value of the merchandise. 46 To qual-
ify for the duty-free preference, articles must be imported di-
rectly from Israel.47
D. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates
Determination of the country of origin of an article im-
ported into the United States is necessary to determine the ap-
plicable rate of duty. The Tariff Schedules of the United States
provide for two rates of duty, the "Column 1" and the "Col-
umn 2" rates. Column 1 rates are applied generally to imports
from countries that receive most-favored-nation ("MFN")
treatment from the United States, while Column 2 rates are
extended to countries that do not receive MFN treatment.48
Column 2 represents the statutory rate enacted by the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff of 1930,49 the highest in the history of the
43. Id. gen. headnote 3(a).
44. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 2112 note (Supp. III 1985). Negotiation of the Free Trade Area was author-
ized in title IV of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 401-406,
98 Stat. 2948, 3013-18. See Palmeter, The Trade and Tarif Act of 1984: From the Customs
Treatment of Manhole Covers to the Return of Goods from Outer Space, 11 SYRACUSEJ. INr'L
L. & CoM. 487, 532 (1984).
45. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, supra note 44, § 402.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 gen. headnote 3(d) (Supp. I1 1985).
49. Act ofJune 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
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United States. 50 The rate in Column 1 reflects the reductions
in the Column 2 rates that have resulted from various rounds
of tariff-cutting trade negotiations. 5'
Once again, the origin situation is clear when an article is
totally the product of a single country, and once again, the test
should be "substantial transformation" when more than one
country is involved. But this has been confused by the Cus-
toms Service. In a recent ruling, Customs posed the issue in
these unsurprising terms: "whether the cutting process pro-
ducing the instant merchandise constitutes a substantial trans-
formation thereby entitling the merchandise to entry.., under
column 1 .... [I]f the merchandise has not been substantially
transformed, it is dutiable under column 2 .... -52 But this
ruling does not even mention a highly relevant prior decision
by the Treasury Department, the parent agency of Customs.53
Probably this omission is just as well.
The question answered by Treasury in that prior decision
was whether linen piece goods manufactured in Czechoslova-
kia, further processed in Belgium or West Germany, and then
exported to the United States, were dutiable as the product of
Czechoslovakia or as the product of Belgium or West Ger-
many. Treasury stated:
[T]he term "substantial transformation" has no direct ap-
plicability to the determination required pursuant to Gen-
eral Headnote 3[(d)] . . ..
This puzzling statement is followed by one that approaches the
amazing:
[T]his issue is to be determined not on the question of
whether the "loomstate" linen piece goods underwent a
"substantial transformation" in either Belgium or West
Germany, but rather whether the printing and finishing op-
erations accomplished in these countries result in a new and
different article possessing a distinctive name, character, or
use substantially different from that which it possessed
50. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 10TH CONG., IST SESS.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 4-5 (Comm. Print 1987); see
alsoJ. DOBSON, Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS 34 (1976).
51. d.
52. C.S.D. 84-17, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 433 (1983).
53. T.D. 78-202, 12 Cust. B. & Dec. 433 (1977).
54. Id.
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before printing and finishing.55
Perhaps Treasury was attempting to deal with the "some-sub-
stantial-transformations-are-more-'substantial'-than-others"
problem, as it stated that "each situation must be determined
on a case-by-case basis and cases involving 'substantial trans-
formation' for other purposes under the tariff laws (e.g., mark-
ing, drawback... ) are valuable only as extrinsic aids in making
such determinations. ' 56 But even this possibility is far from
clear, for Treasury states that the issue is not substantial trans-
formation, but whether the process results "in a new and dif-
ferent article possessing a distinctive name, character or use
substantially different from that which it possessed before."
What is the difference? And what does Treasury mean by cit-
ing the Anheuser-Busch case as its only authority for this remark-
able statement? Anheuser-Busch-the landmark substantial
transformation case-defines the required transformation as
one in which "a new and different article must emerge. 57
How is it authority for the proposition that "substantial trans-
formation" and "new and different article" are not the same?
Moreover, Anheuser-Busch is a drawback case, precisely the kind
of case, according to the same ruling, that is "valuable only" as
an "extrinsic" aid in making determinations. Fortunately, this
ruling seems to have been given a well-deserved burial.
E. Taiff Provisions-American Goods Returned
When United States merchandise is exported and subse-
quently re-imported, it is fully dutiable, as if it were a totally
foreign product, unless it falls into one of four specified ex-
emptions.5 Products of the United States exported and re-
turned without having been advanced in value or improved in
55. Id. (citing Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556
(1908)).
56. Id.
57. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908).
58. The basic exemptions are set out in the Tariff Schedules:
products of the United States exported and returned without having
been advanced in value or improved in condition abroad. TSUSA Item
800.00/HS 9801.00.10.
articles exported for repairs or alterations and returned. TSUSA Item
806.20/HS 9802.00.40.
articles of metal (except precious metal) manufactured in the United
States, or subject to a process of manufacture in the United States, exported
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condition are free of duty. In the case of articles returned after
repair, alteration, or processing, only the value added by the
foreign operation is subject to duty. For articles returned after
assembly, the value of the U.S. components is deducted from
the total value to arrive at dutiable value. Country of origin
issues arise in connection with these tariff items both as to the
United States origin of the product returned and as to the ex-
tent to which foreign operations substantially-or otherwise-
transform the article.
1. American Goods Not Advanced in Value
This item has commercial significance because limited
processes may be applied to articles in another country without
advancing their value or improving their condition. 59 To be
eligible for duty-free treatment, the returned article must be a
product of the United States. 60 The substantial transformation
test is used to make this determination.6 Previously imported
articles, on which duty has been paid, may also receive duty-
free treatment upon re-importation, but with limitations that
do not apply to products of the United States.62
for processing and returned for further processing. TSUSA Item
806.30/HS 9802.00.60.
articles assembled abroad from components produced in the United
States. TSUSA Item 807.00./HS 9802.00.80
A proposed Harmonized System (HS) is scheduled to replace the TSUSA on January
1, 1988. When this occurs, HS numbers will replace TSUSA numbers. HS numbers
given in this article are taken from Trade Policy Staff Committee, Conversion of the
Tarif Schedules of the United States into the Nomenclature Structure of the Harmonized System,
Revised, Showing Administrative Changes Approved by the Trade Policy Staff Committee (Oct.
1986).
59. For example, fishhooks exported in bulk, assembled and placed in retail
packages abroad, were held not to be advanced in value or improved in condition
abroad, and were, therefore, entitled to duty-free entry. United States v. John V.
Carr & Son, Inc., 496 F.2d 1225 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Similarly, tomatoes grown in the
United States, exported for sorting, grading and retail packaging, were eligible for
duty-free treatment upon their return. Border Brokerage Co. v. United States, 65
Cust. Ct. 50, 314 F. Supp. 788 (1970).
60. TSUSA Item 800.00/HS 9801.00.10 provides, in part: "Products of the
United States when returned after having been exported ......
61. See UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1695, THE IMPACT OF
RULES OF ORIGIN ON U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 34 (1985) [hereinafter USITC PUB.
No. 1695].
62. See TSUSA Item 801.10/HS 9801.00.25.
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2. American Goods Repaired or Altered Abroad
Substantial transformation is the key issue here. Articles
exported for repair or alteration are dutiable only on the value
of the repair or alteration.63 But if the foreign processing goes
beyond repair or alteration, a substantial transformation oc-
curs, and the article is dutiable on its full value.64
Repairs and alterations are distinguished from finishing
operations by the fact that they are made to completed articles.
Thus, the coating of glass beads for costume jewelry was held
to be an alteration of the completed uncoated beads with
which they were used interchangeably,65 but the cutting of
nonwoven fabrics to customer specifications constituted not an
alteration but the final step in the manufacturing process.66
Similarly, the redyeing of an already-dyed fabric is an altera-
tion,6 7 but the dyeing and finishing of greige goods is not.68
This, in fact, was held to produce a "new and different arti-
cle." 69
This subject may be concluded with the saga of the dogs
exported to Canada to be trained as hunting dogs and re-im-
ported after training. "Because such training constitutes an al-
teration which advances the value and improves the condition
of the exported animals," the Customs Service ruled, "the
dogs are dutiable only on the value of their training."' 70 For
customs purposes, therefore, not all canine alterations are sub-
stantial transformations.
63. TSUSA Item 806.20/HS 9802.00.40; see 19 C.F.R. § 10.8 (1987).
64. Conversion of steel ingots into steel slabs was found to be more than an
alteration. See Burstrom v. United States, 44 C.C.P.A. 27 (1956). So too was the
tempering of annealed glass for use in patio doors, which was held to transform the
product into a new and different commercial article. See Guardian Indus. Corp. v.
United States, 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 9 (1982).
65. See Royal Bead Novelty Co. v. United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 154, 342 F. Supp.
1394, 1400 (1972).
66. U.S. Customs Internal Advice Ruling 40/85, CLA-2 CO:R:VC:G 076861 JAS
(Oct. 31, 1986).
67. Amity Fabrics, Inc. v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 64 (1959).
68. Dolliff& Co. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct. 1,455 F. Supp. 618 (1978), aff'd,
599 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
69. Dofllf, 81 Cust. Ct. at 5, 455 F. Supp. at 622.
70. T.D. 66-7(1), 101 Treas. Dec. 12, 13 (1966).
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3. American Metal Articles Processed Abroad
A special rule exists for a metal article that is exported for
processing and returned.7 ' It must be "manufactured in the
United States or subject to a process of manufacture in the
United States" if it is to be dutiable only on the foreign value
added. 72 An important requirement is that the exported arti-
cle, as processed outside the United States, or that results from
that processing, must be subject to still further processing after
its return to the United States.73
4. American Components Assembled Abroad
The value of components that are the product of the
United States may be deducted from the dutiable value of qual-
ified imported articles.74 A "product of the United States," ac-
cording to the regulations of the Customs Service, is an article
manufactured within the Customs territory of the United
States. It may consist wholly of United States components or
materials, of United States and foreign components or materi-
als, or wholly of foreign components or materials. "If the arti-
cle consists wholly or partially of foreign components or
materials, the manufacturing process must be such that the for-
eign components or materials have been substantially transformed
into a new and different article, or have been merged into a new
and different article."-75
In addition to the requirement that the components as-
sembled abroad be products of the United States, eligibility for
U.S. component treatment depends upon whether the compo-
nents were exported in a condition ready for assembly without
further fabrication, whether they lost their physical identity in
the assembled article by a change in form, shape, or otherwise,
and whether they were advanced in value or improved in con-
dition while abroad. Assembly and operations incidental to
the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating, and paint-
71. TSUSA Item 806.30/HS 9802.00.60.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 10.9(a) (1987).
74. TSUSA Item 807.00/HS 9802.00.80 provides for "A duty upon the full
value of the imported article, less the cost or value of such products of the United
States ......
75. 19 C.F.R. § 10.12(e) (1987) (emphasis added).
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ing are not counted in the calculation of improved condition.78
Customs defines "substantial transformation" in its regula-
tions dealing with this item:
Substantial transformation occurs when, as a result of man-
ufacturing processes, a new and different article emerges, having
a distinctive name, character or use, which is different from that
originally possessed by the article or material before being
subject to the manufacturing process. The mere finishing
or modification of a partially or nearly complete foreign
product in the United States will not result in the substan-
tial transformation of such product and it remains the prod-
uct of a foreign country."
Compare this language with the wording included in the defi-
nition of "ultimate purchaser" for country of origin marking
purposes: the ultimate purchaser is one who "subjects the im-
ported article to a process which results in a substantial transfor-
mation of the article, even though the process may not result in a new
or different article."178
Thus, for purposes of one Customs regulation, a substan-
tial transformation occurs when "a new and different article
emerges," and for purposes of another, a substantial transfor-
mation may occur "even though the process may not result in a
new or different article."
All of this is even more confusing in light of the language
of T.D. 78-202, 79 which tells us-perhaps consistently with the
ultimate purchaser regulation-that a substantial transforma-
tion can occur without the emergence of a new and different
article. Yet the ruling cites only Anheuser-Busch as authority
when that case specifically requires that "a new and different
article must emerge. '"80
F. Drawback
Anheuser-Busch, as we have noted, was a drawback case.8 1
The term "drawback" refers to the refund of duties paid on
imported merchandise that has been used in the manufacture
76. TSUS Item 807.00/HS 9802.00.80.
77. 19 C.F.R. § 10.14(b) (1987) (emphasis added).
78. 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(d)(1) (emphasis added).
79. 12 Cust. B. & Dec. 433 (1977); see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
80. Anheuser-Busch, 207 U.S. at 562.
81. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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or production of an article in the United States when that arti-
cle is later exported.8 2 "The theory underlying the granting of
drawback ... is and always has been that it would encourage
the development in the United States of the making of articles
for export, thus increasing our foreign commerce and aiding
domestic industry and labor.""3
Although the substantial transformation test derives from
a drawback case, the term itself is absent both from the draw-
back law and from the drawback regulations. The latter simply
define a "drawback product" as "a finished or partially finished
product manufactured in the United States under a drawback
contract."18 4 Given the theory underlying the granting of draw-
back, it would make sense for the law and the regulations not
to require a substantial transformation to determine whether
an article is "manufactured or produced" in the United States
for drawback purposes. Yet there is the Anheuser-Busch lan-
guage, and its requirement that "a new and different article
must emerge," a requirement that, as noted, is absent from the
country of origin marking regulation implementing a law in-
tended to inform consumers of the origin of their purchases.8 5
Comparing the language of the Anheuser-Busch test with that of
the marking regulation, a greater degree of transformation
seems to be required before drawback will be granted than is
required before a consumer no longer need be notified of the
foreign origin of an article. Given the stated purpose of the
two laws, this seems to be the reverse of the way it should be.
Customs, by its drawback regulation, seems to have corrected
the anomaly, albeit perhaps by winking at some old Supreme
Court language that it appears to find useful to employ in con-
texts other than the one in which the words arose.
G. Government Procurement
The Buy American Act requires the Federal Government
82. "Upon the exportation of articles manufactured or produced in the United States
with the use of imported merchandise, the full amount of the duties paid upon the
merchandise so used shall be refunded as drawback, less I per centum of such duties
.... 19 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
83. United States v. International Paint Co., -35 C.C.P.A. 87, 90 (1948).
84. 19 C.F.R. § 191.2(g) (1987).
85. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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to give preference to American-made goods in its purchases.8 6
A country of origin determination is required to determine
what is and what is not "American" for purposes of the Buy
American Act.8 7 A second country of origin determination is
required to learn whether the Buy American preference may
be waived in accordance with the terms of the international
Agreement on Government Procurement, which provides for
non-discriminatory treatment for products of signatory coun-
88
To determine if a product originates in a country that is a
signatory to the Agreement, and is therefore eligible for waiver
of the Buy American preference, the substantial transforma-
tion test is used:
An article is a product of a country or instrumentality only if
(i) it is wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of that
country or instrumentality, or (ii) in the case of an article
which consists in whole or in part of materials from another
country or instrumentality, it has been substantially trans-
formed into a new and different article of commerce with a
name, character, or use distinct from that of the article or
articles from which it was so transformed.8 9
This formulation of the "substantial transformation" test dif-
fers slightly from those contained in the court decisions and in
86. 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10d (1982).
87. Unfortunately, the Buy American Act employs terminology to define U.S.
merchandise that differs even further from that used in the customs context. The Act
refers to ". . . only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have
been mined or produced in the United States, and only such manufactured articles,
materials, and supplies as have been manufactured in the United States substantially
all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the
case may be, in the United States ..... Id. § IOa. The Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions refer to a "domestic end product" which "means (a) an unmanufactured end
product mined or produced in the United States, or (b) an end product manufactured
in the United States, if the cost of its components mined, produced, or manufactured
in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all its components." 48 C.F.R.
§ 25.101 (1986).
88. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 11, 1979, reprinted in AGREE-
MENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. i, at 67-189 (1979). For the authorita-
tive commentary on the Agreement on Government Procurement, see Pomeranz, To-
ward a New International Order in Government Procurement, I I LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1263 (1979).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(B) (1982).
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the regulations we have examined. Whether the difference is
significant, or whether it is mere linguistic trivia, remains to be
seen.
II. "SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFORMATION" AND
"SUBSTANTIAL MANUFACTURING"
Whether a substantial transformation has occurred has de-
pended historically upon the nature of the article emerging
from a particular process-as compared to the nature of the
article that entered the process-and not on the nature of the
process itself.90 To be sure, the process is a relevant factor in
the determination, and typically it is set forth in the deci-
sions. 9' But the question has continually arisen whether an ar-
ticle has been substantially transformed-by whatever pro-
cess-into a new and different article having, in the words of
Anheuser-Busch, "a distinctive name, character or use. "92
Substantial transformation can occur-a new and different
article can be produced-by means of an "insubstantial" pro-
cess. Congress recognized this fact when, for example, it en-
acted the rule of origin requirements that apply to both GSP
and CBI. 9' These preferential duty schemes require both a
90. "There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge,
'having a distinctive name, character or use.'" Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v.
United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562. "Just how complex the operation was does not
appear, but we do not think that is important .... " United States v. International
Paint Co., 35 C.C.P.A. 87, 95 (1948). "Slabs ... are clearly not the same articles as
ingots and differ therefrom in name, value, appearance, size, shape and use." Bur-
strom v. United States, 44 C.C.P.A. 27, 29 (1956). "We do not deem it necessary to
determine whether or not the processes employed at the plaintiff's Tube Line plant
in the conversion of the imported articles into flanges and fittings are generally prev-
alent throughout any segment of the industry in the United States .... [t]he end
result of the manufacturing processes to which the imported articles are subjected in
plaintiff's Tube Line plant is the transformation of such imported articles into differ-
ent articles having a new name, character and use." Midwood Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 64 Cust. Ct. 499, 507 (1970). "[W]here, as here, foreign processing of an
export article, to whatever degree, produces such changes in the performance character-
istics of the exported article as to alter its subsequent handling and uses over that
which earlier prevailed, the resultant product is of necessity a new and different arti-
cle." Dolliff & Co., Inc. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct. 1, 5, 455 F. Supp. 618, 622
(1978) (emphasis added), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
91. Anheuser-Busch, 207 U.S. at 559 n.l; Burstrom, 44 C.C.P.A. at 29; International
Paint, 35 C.C.P.A. at 89-90; Dolliff & Co., Inc., 81 Cust. Ct. at 2, 455 F. Supp. at 619;
Midwood Industries, 64 Cust. Ct. at 504.
92. Anheuser-Busch, 207 U.S. at 562.
93. See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
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substantial transformation and a contribution of at least 35%
to the appraised value of the new and different article. Implicit
in this 35% requirement is the fact that a substantial transfor-
mation can occur with less than 35%: "These specific rules are
designed to preclude the possibility of the beneficiary coun-
tries serving as mere conduits for articles that in reality origi-
nate outside the region."9 ' Indeed, the President originally
proposed a 25% minimum for CBI, thereby recognizing that a
process which left untouched as much as 75% of the value of
an article nevertheless could transform it substantially. 95 But
even while the Administration and the Congress were acknowl-
edging that operations "serving as mere conduits" could effect
a substantial transformation, 96 the Court of International
Trade, in Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States,97 was undermining this
doctrine and was providing the rationale for a new and more
restrictive test: "substantial transformation" plus "substantial
manufacturing."
The issue presented in Uniroyal was whether footwear up-
pers, consisting of complete shoes except for the outsoles,
were substantially transformed by the attachment of the out-
soles. The court held that they were not. The imported up-
pers underwent no physical change whatsoever, being subject
only to finishing by addition of the outsoles. The court drew
an analogy to "attaching buttons to a man's dress shirt or at-
taching handles to a finished piece of luggage. '9 8 The im-
ported upper, "the very essence of the finished shoe,'"" re-
tained its identity throughout the process: it was a shoe when
the process began, and it was a shoe when the process ended.
There appears to be no reason to quarrel with this hold-
ing. However, in reaching it, the court relied in part upon a
comparison of the process that produced the shoe uppers with
the process that attached the outsoles. The court found the
process of attaching the outsoles less time consuming and less
costly than the process of producing the uppers, and it found
that more highly-skilled labor was needed to produce the up-
94. H.R. 2973 SENATE FINANCE EXPLANATION, supra note 40, at 34.
95. H.R. REP. No. 266, supra note 36, at 12.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 220, 542 F. Supp. 1026 (1982).
98. Id. at 224, 542 F. Supp. at 1030.
99. Id. at 225, 542 F. Supp. at 1030.
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pers than to attach the outsoles. 100 The attachment of the out-
soles, the court said, "is a minor assembly operation which re-
quires only a small fraction of the time and cost involved in
producing the uppers."' 0 1
Where Uniroyal broke new ground-and where it went
astray-was not in finding the attachment of the outsoles to be
a "minor assembly operation," but in holding relevant the
magnitude of this operation as compared to the magnitude of
the processes that produced the uppers. A "minor assembly
operation" that does not change the identity of a product does
not substantially transform that product, regardless of whether
it involves a small or a large fraction of the time and the cost
involved in producing the original article. On the other hand,
a substantial transformation can occur even though the pro-
cess that transforms the article is of smaller magnitude than
that which produced it.10 2
Uniroyal's dictum that a substantial transformation cannot
occur without substantial manufacturing, -as we have seen, flies
in the face of the Congressional understanding as exemplified
by the "substantial transformation plus value added" criteria
of the GSP and the CBI. It flies in the face of the cases from
Anheuser-Busch forward. It was unnecessary to the result of the
Uniroyal case, which seems correctly decided on its facts. But it
offered a protectionist straw that has been grasped by the Cus-
toms Service to fashion highly restrictive special rules of origin
for textile and apparel imports and for an increasingly restric-
tionist series of origin rulings for steel products as well.
A. Textiles
Action to change the rules of origin for textiles and textile
products began-as many actions that affect these industries
begin-in an election year.' 03 In response to industry com-
plaints that textiles and textile products were being imported
100. Id. at 222-23, 542 F. Supp. at 1028.
101. Id. at 224, 542 F. Supp. at 1030.
102. This appears to have been the situation in Burstrom v. United States, 44
C.C.P.A. 27 (1956). See generally supra notes 64, 90-92 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Burstrom and other cases).
103. Giesse & Lewin, The Multifiber Arrangement: "Tenporary" Protection Run
Amuck, 19 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51, 93 (1987).
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in circumvention of existing quotas, 0 4 President Reagan, on
May 9, 1984, directed the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
new country of origin regulations for textiles and apparel. 0 5
Interim regulations were published in August 1984,106 and fi-
nal regulations in March 1985.'07 They provide:
A textile or textile product will be considered to have un-
dergone a substantial transformation if it has been transformed
by means of substantial manufacturing or processing operations
into a new and different article of commerce. 10 8
Criteria for determining country of origin are given, with the
qualification that they are not exhaustive, that one or any com-
bination may be determinative. Additional factors that may be
considered are:
(1) A new and different article of commerce will usu-
ally result from a manufacturing or processing operation if
there is a change in:
(i) Commercial designation or identity,
(ii) Fundamental character or
(iii) Commercial use.
(2) In determining whether merchandise has been sub-
jected to substantial manufacturing or processing opera-
tions, the following will be considered:
(i) The physical change in the material or article as a
result of the manufacturing or processing operations in
each foreign territory or country, or insular possession
of the U.S.
(ii) The time involved in the manufacturing or process-
ing operations in each foreign territory or country, or
insular possession of the U.S.
(iii) The complexity of the manufacturing or process-
ing operations in each foreign territory or country, or
insular possession of the U.S.
(iv) The level or degree of skill and/or technology re-
quired in the manufacturing or processing operations
in each foreign territory or country, or insular posses-
sion of the U.S.
104. Id. at 129.42.
105. Exec. Order No. 12,475, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1985). nprinted in 7 U.S.C. § 1854
note, at 363-64 (Supp. I1 1985).
106. T.D. 84-171, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 480 (1984).
107. T.D. 85-38, 19 Cust. B. & Dec. 1 (1985); 19 C.F.R. § 12.130 (1987).
108. 19 C.F.R. § 12.130(b) (emphasis added).
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(v) The value added to the article or material in each
foreign territory or country, or insular possession of
the U.S., compared to its value when imported into the
U.S. 109
The regulations follow with specific examples of operations
that usually will, or will not, confer origin.
10
The textile rules of origin have one purpose and one pur-
pose only: to restrict imports of textiles and textile products.
"Because of the nature of textile and apparel products and cur-
rent conditions of international trade in these products," the
109. It § 12.130(d).
110. See id § 12.130(e), which reads:
(e) Manufacturing or processing operations. (1) An article or material usu-
ally will be a product of a particular foreign territory or country, or insular
possession of the U.S., when it has undergone prior to importation into the
U.S. in that foreign territory or country, or insular possession any of the
following:
(i) Dyeing of fabric and printing when accompanied by two or more of
the following finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, nap-
ping, decating, permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent embossing,
or moireing;
(ii) Spinning fibers into yarn;
(iii) Weaving, knitting or otherwise forming fabric;
(iv) Cutting of fabric into parts and the assembly of those parts into the
completed article; or
(v) Substantial assembly by sewing and/or tailoring of all cut pieces of
apparel articles which have been cut from fabric in another foreign ter-
ritory or country, or insular possession, into a completed garment (e.g.
the complete assembly and tailoring of all cut pieces of suit-type jackets,
suits, and shirts).
(2) An article or material usually will not be considered to be a product of a
particular foreign territory or country, or insular possession of the U.S. by
virtue of merely having undergone any of the following:
(i) Simple combining operations, labeling, pressing, cleaning or dry
cleaning, or packaging operations, or any combination thereof;
(ii) Cutting to length or width and hemming or overlocking fabrics
which are readily identifiable as being intended for a particular com-
mercial use;
(iii) Trimming and/or joining together by sewing, looping, linking, or
other means of attaching otherwise completed knit-to-shape compo-
nent parts produced in a single country, even when accompanied by
other processes (e.g. washing, drying, mending, etc.) normally incident
to the assembly process;
(iv) One or more finishing operations on yams, fabrics, or other textile
articles, such as showerproofing, superwashing, bleaching, decating,
fulling, shrinking, mercerizing, or similar operations; or
(v) Dyeing and/or printing of fabrics or yams.
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U.S. International Trade Commission reported, "rules of ori-
gin have a particularly significant impact.""' The Commission
explained that textiles and textile products undergo a se-
quence of processes, and may be traded at any point along this
sequence:
[A] finished apparel item may be the end result of a process
that began with production of the raw fiber and continued
through spinning of the yarn, weaving the fabric, dyeing
and finishing the fabric, cutting the fabric into pieces ac-
cording to pattern, sewing or otherwise assembling the
pieces, adding buttons, zippers, pockets, linings, and orna-
mentation, and labeling and packaging the end product.
Products in any of these stages may be shipped to another
country for further processing." 2
By changing the rules for established trade patterns for prod-
ucts already governed by country-specific quotas, Customs was
able to alter the charging of an imported product from one
country quota to another; if the new country of origin has no
quota for the product, the import will be excluded. This is
precisely what occurred in trade involving China and Hong
Kong, two of the largest suppliers to the United States.1 '5 The
Commission explained:
Previously products processed in Hong Kong using inter-
mediate materials from China qualified as products of Hong
Kong and entered the U.S. under Hong Kong's quotas.
Under the new regulations, some of these products will be
classified as products of China rather than of Hong Kong.
Since China has fully utilized its quotas in the past, this will
have the effect of reducing China's exports of intermediate
materials to Hong Kong for reexport to the United
States.' 14
111. USITC PUB. No. 1695, supra note 61, at 79.
112. Id. The purely protective motivation for the new rules is shown in their
different treatment of knit-to-shape and cut-apparel components. Importers tend to
utilize the first, U.S. producers with overseas operations the latter; thus Customs de-
termined that the final assembly of knit-to-shape components would not confer ori-
gin, but that the final assembly of cut-apparel components would do so. Giesse &
Lewin, supra note 103, at 140-41.
113. Giesse & Lewin, supra note 103, at 135.
114. Id. at 135. But attempts to contort rules of origin for protectionist pur-
poses may have unintended consequences. Customs has been compelled to rule, in
conformity with the new rules of origin, that when sweater parts knitted by machine
in the United Kingdom are combined and finished in China, the country or origin of
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The regulations have withstood judicial challenge,' ' 5 but
present interesting, unresolved legal questions nonetheless.
Their authority was not drawn from the Tariff Act and its
marking statute," 16 but rather from section 204 of the Agricul-
tural Act of 1956, which authorizes the President to negotiate
agreements with foreign governments limiting exports of tex-
tiles and textile products to the United States." 17 However, the
textile rules were not intended to have any impact on the rules
of origin as they are applied under the different laws in which
origin determinations are relevant:
Customs believes that Congress, by using similar language
in statutes dealing with the origin of merchandise, clearly
intended that there should be only one rule for determining
the country of origin of merchandise without regard to the
particular statute requiring that determination. Therefore,
it is believed that Congress did not intend for Customs to apply one
rule of origin for duty and marking purposes and a different rule of
origin for the purposes of Section 204.118
Yet it is clear that :the textile rules of origin change the rules
that apply for marking purposes. Indeed, because the marking
statute-until Uniroyal-had been read judicially as not requir-
ing substantial manufacturing to accomplish a substantial
transformation,' 9 it can be argued that Customs, in its textile
rules, contravenes the marking law. To the contrary, Customs
would contend, for Uniroyal changed things:
[Ilt is Customs' view that the origin rules in section 12.130
are derived from Customs' interpretation of various court
cases, most particularly Uniroyal. Therefore, the principles
of origin contained in section 12.130 are applicable to mer-
chandise for all purposes, including duty and marking.'
21
the completed sweater is the United Kingdom-a country whose exports of textiles to
the United States were not, at the time of the ruling, subject to quota. C.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 079,844 (Apr. 16, 1987).
115. See Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 596 F. Supp. 1567
(1984). This was a challenge to the interim regulations in which, inter alia, an injunc-
tion was sought.
116. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982).
117. 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982).
118. T.D. 85-38, 19 Cust. B. & Dec. at 64-65, 50 Fed. Reg. at 8713 (emphasis
added).
119. See United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (1940); Mid-
wood Indus., Inc. v. United States, 64 Gust. Ct. 499 (1970).
120. T.D. 85-38, 19 Gust. B. & Dec. at 68, 50 Fed. Reg. at 8714.
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This brings us to Yuri Fashions Co. v. United States,12 ' a case
in which Customs denied entry to sweaters from the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI"), maintain-
ing that, under the textile rules, the sweaters were a product of
Korea, and, therefore were subject to the quota applicable to
sweaters from Korea.1 22 Plaintiff argued that the sweaters met
the criteria necessary to qualify for duty-free treatment as a
product of an insular possession, but to no avail, the Court
agreeing with Customs:
In effect, the country of origin of the merchandise was Ko-
rea for textile restraint purposes, and may have been the
CNMI for duty and marking purposes. This situation may
be awkward, but there is no violation .... 123
Reconcile one country of origin for textile restraint pur-
poses and another for duty and marking purposes with "Con-
gress did not intend for Customs to apply one rule of origin
for duty and marking purposes and a different rule of origin
for the purposes of Section 204.' 124 Clearly, the positions can-
not be reconciled.
Has Customs, then, abandoned its "one rule of origin"
position? It depends. A year after the March 1986 Yuri Fash-
ions decision, the agency issued yet another restrictive ruling
on sweaters. Previously, Customs had held New Zealand to be
the country of origin of sweaters sewn and finished there from
parts knitted in China, the parts being made from yarn pro-
duced in New Zealand from wool grown in New Zealand. No
longer, said Customs. China-with its already-filled quota-is
the country of origin of these sweaters as well. In the course of
delivering yet one more restrictionist ruling, Customs opined:
Although section 12.130 was specifically promulgated for
quota, visa, and export license purposes, the principles of
origin contained therein were derived from recent judicial
decisions (e.g., Uniroyal v. United States) and represent the
law, as Customs understands it, to be applied in all country
of origin decisions.' 25
121. 632 F. Supp. 41 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
122. Id. at 43.
123. Id at 47 (footnote omitted). Since the merchandise was denied entry, duty
was not assessed and the question of marking was mooted.
124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. T.D. 87-29, 21 Cust. B. & Dec. adv. sheet no. 12, at 1, 9, 52 Fed. Reg. 7825,
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This situation indeed is "awkward." This awkwardness ex-
tends to the other industry that is the special object of Cus-
toms (and Congressional) solicitude-the steel industry.
B. Steel
For two decades, trade in steel and steel products has
been, together with trade in textiles and textile products, a ma-
jor trade policy issue in the United States. We have had the
"voluntary" export restraints of the 1960s, the Trigger Price
Mechanism of the 1970s, and scores of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty cases in the early 1980s.' 26 We now have a se-
ries of bilateral agreements with major steel exporters, author-
ized by the Steel Import Stabilization Act, that limit United
States imports of steel and steel products. 2 7 As is the case
with textiles, the country-specific import quotas that result
from the bilateral agreements bring country of origin issues to
the fore. And, as is the case with textiles, the response of the
Customs Service to this situation is, on the whole, restriction-
ist. This restrictionist response is discernible as yet only from
a few specific cases, but it seems well established. There are so
far no comprehensive rules of origin for steel, as there are for
textiles; steel issues currently are being decided case-by-case.
Some earlier steel rulings offer a perspective on the re-
strictionist trend that is developing in the contemporary steel
rulings. For example, Customs ruled in 1965 that steel plate of
United States origin, exported for simple tempering and
quenching (heat treatment), was not eligible upon its reimport
for favorable duty treatment as returned American goods be-
cause the tempering and quenching imparted new characteris-
7828 (Mar. 13, 1987). These rulings bring to mind the remark ofJustice Potter Stew-
art that the sole consistency he could find in a line of antitrust cases was that "the
Government always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301
(1965). In recent Customs rulings, particularly textile and steel rulings, the only con-
sistency seems to be that the restrictionists always win.
126. See Horlick & Savage, Steel Trade Wars, 1968-84, How Washington Became the
Center of U.S. Steel Trade, WORLD L., July-Aug. 1984, at 5.
127. The United States has negotiated bilateral steel restraint agreements with
eighteen countries and the European Communities (excluding Portugal and Spain
with which there are separate agreements). UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N,
Pus. No. 1984, MONTHLY REPORTS ON THE STATUS OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY vi (1987).
The Steel Import Stabilization Act was enacted as title VIII of the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3043-47.
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tics to the steel that went beyond alteration." 8 By clear impli-
cation the steel had undergone substantial transformation be-
cause a finished article, advanced in value but not altered by
the advance, must be transformed; there is no third category in
the law. A decade later in 1975, Customs ruled that when un-
machined castings for hose couplings were machined, drilled,
threaded, plated, and assembled, they too were substantially
transformed. 12 9
Three years later, this ruling was cited as authority, along
with Midwood Industries Inc. v. United States,130 for a determina-
tion that the simple threading of stainless-steel pipe fittings
constituted a substantial transformation: "[W]e are of the
opinion that the end result of the threading process is the
transformation of the fittings into new and different articles of
commerce. Threading, in this case, is a substantial manufac-
turing process.'1 3'
This is a somewhat surprising ruling because it involved
only threading, while the ruling upon which it relied involved
machining, drilling, plating, and assembly in addition to
threading, and Midwood itself involved, plating, machining,
drilling, and painting in addition to threading. To the more
cynical, however, the ruling is not totally surprising: its conse-
quence was to confer country of origin status on Japan, not on
Taiwan, and thereby to deny the product duty-free treatment
under the GSP. A decade later, when it was realized that this
ruling could permit the establishment of threading operations
in countries without bilateral restraint agreements, thereby
permitting "circumvention" of the steel quotas, Customs re-
versed itself: "[T]he threading operation does not so trans-
form the unthreaded fitting as to cause its identity to be lost in
the finished product."' 3 2 Citing Uniroyal, Customs observed
that "the nature of the threading operation is insubstantial in
relation to the nature of the operations required to manufac-
ture the fitting."'
128. T.D. 56,545(l), 100 Treas. Dec. 868 (1965).
129. T.D. 75-199, 9 Cust. B. & Dec. 435 (1975).
130. 64 Cust. Ct. 499 (1970).
131. C.S.D. 79-437, 13 Cust. B. & Dec. 1666 (1978).
132. T.D. 87-46, 21 Cust. B. & Dec. adv. sheet no. 16, at 4, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,217
(Apr. 8, 1987).
133. Id. at 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 11,217.
1987]
34 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 11:1
This later ruling in fact is probably correct, totally apart
from its unnecessary reliance on Uniroyal's dictum as to the
comparative magnitude of the processes. The simple thread-
ing of an already completed casting is akin to adding buttons
to a shirt or handles to luggage, to use Uniroyal's examples, if
not its rationale. 34 The steel fitting remains a steel fitting-it
simply has undergone a finishing operation, not a substantial
transformation into a new and different article of commerce. 35
Yet, in spite of its apparent embrace of the Uniroyal dic-
tum, Customs stated, in a still later ruling involving wire pro-
duced from imported wire rod:
The relative simplicity of the process does not change the
fact that the character of the resulting product may be sig-
nificantly different.36
This sentence is a perfect statement of the law that existed
from Anheuser-Busch until Uniroyal's confusing "compare the
processes" dictum, and it is a perfect statement of the law if
Uniroyal's holding, not its dictum, is followed. Yet, inexplica-
bly, this sentence is preceded by one that conveys just the op-
posite message:
The processing of wire rod into wire involves operations
and equipment which, when compared to the operations
and equipment necessary to produce the wire rod, are rela-
tively simple and inexpensive.' 37
Since the drawing process accounted for only 11 % of the value
of the wire, Customs accordingly found the "substantial
processing" standard that evolved from the Uniroyal dictum
"not satisfied."' 138
134. See 3 Ct. Int'l Trade at 224, 542 F. Supp. at 1030.
135. As in Uniroyal, the shoe remained a shoe, and as in Anheuser-Busch: "A cork
put through the claimant's process is still a cork." 207 U.S. at 562.
136. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 075,923, at 2 (Mar. 18, 1987).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3. Elsewhere, the government has argued successfully that wire is a
very different product from wire rod. See United States v. Kanthal Corp., 554 F.2d
456 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The apparently contradictory language of Letter Ruling
075,923 suggests internal disagreement as to the outcome. It reads very much as if a
negative conclusion were superimposed upon a ruling that found substantial trans-
formation. The request for this ruling was made on March 22, 1985. See C.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 075,923. The fact that Customs required nearly two years to rule only con-
firms the suggestion of internal disagreement. Enforcement of this ruling prelimina-
rily was enjoined by the Court of International Trade but the injunction was lifted
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Eleven percent does not, therefore, satisfy the "substantial
processing" requirement; neither, it appears, does 50%, for
Customs also has ruled that the conversion of black plain-end
pipe into electrical conduit by means of cutting, threading,
hot-dip galvanizing, chromating, varnishing, and assembly, ad-
ding "approximately 50 percent of the value of the completed
conduit," is not substantial transformation. 3 9 In addition to
adding 50% to the value, this process alters the tariff classifica-
tion of the article from "Metals, Their Alloys, and Their Basic
Shapes and Forms" to "Electrical Machinery and Equipment."
Not even the ruling that reversed the previous "threading-is-
substantial-transformation" determination, not even Uniroyal,
would seem to justify this result.
Yet Customs was not through. On March 13, 1986, the
agency published in the Federal Register its ruling changing
the country of origin of wool sweaters from New Zealand to
China. 40  This change was justified, Customs said, because
there is but one law "to be applied in all country of origin deci-
sions."'' 4 '
On the day before this ruling was published, the Court of
International Trade concluded a trial concerning another New
Zealand product-steel sheet that had been annealed and gal-
vanized in New Zealand using cold-rolled sheet from Japan. 42
At issue in that trial was an earlier Customs ruling that the
processing in New Zealand did not substantially transform the
Japanese product, and that the imported product, therefore,
was subject to the quota that applied to Japan, and could not
and the Customs ruling ultimately was upheld. Superior Wire v. United States, Slip
Op. No. 87-98 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 21, 1987). The court in Superior Wire cited
Kanthal simply for the proposition that a change in tariff classification is not disposi-
tive of the issue of substantial transformation. But in Kanthal the issue was more than
simple classification; it was whether wire rod and drawn wire were the same product.
The court said no, because "the manufacturer had drawn the product once, making it
'wire,' and had completed all of the processing steps necessary for the product to be
imported, sold, and used as wire." 554 F.2d at 461. While the issue was not de-
scribed as substantial transformation, the analysis certainly sounds a lot like it.
139. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 076,950 (Feb. 24, 1986).
140. T.D. 87-29, 21 Cust. B. & Dec. adv. sheet no. 12, at 1, 52 Fed. Reg. 7825
(Mar. 13, 1987); see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
141. T.D. 87-29, 21 Cust. B. & Dec. adv. sheet no. 12, at 9, 52 Fed. Reg. at 7825
(Mar. 13, 1987).
142. Ferrostaal Metals Corp. v. United States, Slip Op. No. 87-76, at 4 (Ct. Int'l
Trade June 26, 1987).
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enter quota-free as a product of New Zealand. 43 The court
described the argument made on behalf of the Customs Ser-
vice:
[E]ven though changes have occurred which would ordina-
rily result in a finding of substantial transformation, a differ-
ent result may be found in the context of an agreement
designed to restrict imports, where the Court may apply dif-
ferent criteria requiring more substantial changes in the im-
ported product.'
44
A "different result in the context of an agreement designed to
restrict imports"? "Different criteria requiring more substan-
tial changes"? What ever happened to the law "to be applied
in all country of origin decisions"? 45 How could a federal
agency present such an argument to a federal court when virtu-
ally simultaneously it was pontificating to the contrary in the
Federal Register?
The court, fortunately, would have none of it. It refused
to "depart from policy-neutral rules governing substantial
transformation :in order to achieve wider import restrictions in
particular cases." 146 It found that the processing in New Zea-
143. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 077,578 (Aug. 25, 1986).
144. Ferrostaal Metals, Slip Op. No. 87-76, at 8.
145. T.D. 87-29,.21 Cust. B. & Dec. adv. sheet no. 12, at 9, 52 Fed. Reg. at 7825
(Mar. 13, 1987) (emphasis added).
146. Ferrostaal Metals, Slip Op. No. 87-76, at 10. It is of interest to note that
Judge Dominick L. Di Carlo was the author of Mast Industries, supra note 115, Yuri
Fashions, supra note 121, and Ferrostaal, supra. Mast Industries upheld the textile regula-
tions, in the preamble to which Customs expressed the view that only one rule of
origin applied for all purposes. In Yuri Fashions Judge Di Carlo held that, however
awkward, there could be one rule of origin for textile quotas and another for other
purposes, 632 F. Supp. 41, 47 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), while in Ferrostaal, he rejected
the position advocated on behalf of Customs that there could be one rule of origin
for steel quota purposes and another for other purposes. Ferrostaal, supra, at 10. De-
spite the apparent conflict between Yun Fashions and Ferrostaal, Customs, and not
Judge Di Carlo, is being inconsistent. Mast Industries simply upheld textile regula-
tions that determine origin for quota purposes based on section 204 of the Agricul-
tural Act of 1956; the issue of origin for other purposes was not presented. Yuri
Fashions did present the issue and Judge Di Carlo there held that, "awkward" though
it might be, one rule could apply for section 204 quota purposes and another for
marking purposes-despite the assertions of Customs to the contrary in the pream-
ble to those regulations. In Ferrostaal, there were no competing regulations issued
pursuant to another statute. This is the crucial distinction between Yuri and Ferros-
taal.
In addition, the court in Superior Wire, supra note 138, even while agreeing with
Customs on the question of substantial transformation, rejected the argument that a
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land did effect a substantial transformation, and it held that the
steel was, therefore, a product not of Japan, but of New Zea-
land. 147
That restriction of imports is the paramount factor in the
steel rulings of Customs seems clear. The processing involved
in the few affirmative determinations that have been made is,
by any definition, "substantial," and, therefore, compels a con-
clusion of substantial transformation under the most extreme
definition of the term. 48  Still, reports circulate concerning
possible new steel rules to match the textile rules.' 49  Con-
gress has not been silent. Both the House of Representatives
and the Senate have passed bills authorizing the President to
treat steel imports from countries that do not have bilateral
restraint agreements as the product of a country with an agree-
ment, if the steel from which the import is made was "melted
and poured" in a country with an agreement. 50 Under these
bills, steel sheet from Japan (a country with an agreement) gal-
vanized in New Zealand (a country without an agreement)
different substantial transformation test should be employed because a bilateral steel
agreement was involved.
147. Ferrostaal Metals, supra note 142, at 22. The Court in Ferrostoal seemed to
move away from the Uniroyal analysis, with its emphasis on "substantial manufactur-
ing" as well as "substantial transformation." Ferrostaal turned on the traditional cri-
teria of change in name, character and use, as well as tariff nonmenclature. To be
sure, the court in Ferrostaal found that the processing in New Zealand substantially
added to the value of the finished product. Id. at 16. In so doing, however, the court
did not compare the complexity and costs of the processes performed in Japan to
those performed in New Zealand. Nor, despite the fact that it is mentioned three
times in Ferrostaal, was Uniroyal cited by the court while discussing value. The court
found that the Japanese product accounted for about $350 of the final product's
$550 to $630 value, about 55 to 65%. In these terms, there is an implicit departure
from Uniroyal as New Zealand clearly accounted for less than half of the final value of
the product.
148. Customs determined that the hot-dip galvanizing process, when combined
with surface coating with plastic laminates, is substantial transformation. In addition,
Customs found a dual substantial transformation-and, accordingly, CBI duty-free
eligibility-in the case of oil country tubular goods produced in Panama, a benefici-
ary country, from steel coils imported from a non-beneficiary country. See C.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 553,739 (Nov. 21, 1985). However, this ruling is being reviewed in re-
sponse to an allegation that only a single transformation occurs. 51 Fed. Reg. 39,396
(Oct. 28, 1986).
149. See, e.g., Administration Drafting New Standard to Prevent Transshipments of Steel,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 5, 1987, at 1.
150. See H.R. REP. No. 40, pt. 1, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1987) and Section
323(b) of H.R. 3 as amended and passed by S.1420, 133 Cong. Rec. S10370, S10372
(July 21, 1987).
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could be treated as Japanese for quota purposes despite a sub-
stantial transformation in New Zealand. Under the terms of
the bills, however, if the second country also has an agree-
ment, for example, Mexico, the normal rules of origin would
apply. In this case, the sheet would be Mexican, not Japanese.
Thus, we would have one rule of origin for marking purposes
and another rule for quota purposes--depending not on the
transformation that has occurred, nor even on the magnitude
of the processes involved, but simply on the bilateral agree-
ment status of the countries involved.
Another awkward situation.'-5
III. MARKING REQUIREMENTS
A. General
Rules of origin are used to determine whether an article
must be marked with the name of a foreign country and, if so,
with which country's name. The marking requirements of Sec-
tion 304 of the Tariff Act' 52 determine how the marking is ,to
be done, and under what circumstances exceptions will be
made. The general requirement of Section 304 is that every
article (or, in certain circumstances its container) be marked
with the English name of its country of origin "in a conspicu-
ous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature
of the article (or container)'will permit ....
1. The Name of the Country
Although the statute calls for the English name of the
country of origin, abbreviations and variant spellings are ap-
151. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
152. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, § 304, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (West Supp. 1987)).
153. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982). This section provides in part:
Except as hereinafter provided, every article of foreign origin (or its
container, as provided in subsection (b) hereof) imported into the United
States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and per-
manently as the nature of the article (or container) will permit in such man-
ner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States the English
name of the country of origin of the article.
Id. For an extended discussion of the marking requirement, together with its history
and examples of older decisions, see Note, United States Country of Origin Marking Re-
quirements: The Application of a Nontarif Trade Barrier, 6 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 485
(1974).
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proved, for example, "Gt. Britain" for Great Britain and "Lux-
emb." for Luxembourg. 5 4 Similarly, "Brasil" is acceptable for
Brazil, "Italie" for Italy,15 5 and "Danmark" for Denmark; 56
however, "Fabrication Suisse" is not acceptable for Switzer-
land, 57 nor is "Can." or "Cana." for Canada,' nor "Philip"
for the Philippines. 5 9 Goods imported from the French In-
dian Ocean islands of Amsterdam, St. Paul, and Kerguelen
must be marked with a legend such as "Product of Amsterdam
Island (France)" because the names of the islands are not suffi-
ciently well-known in the United States to permit their use
without the word "France."16 0
If the words "United States," "American," "U.S.A.," or a
variant of them appears on an imported article, the name of
the country of origin, preceded by the phrase "Made in" or
"Product of" or words of similar meaning, must appear in
close proximity in letters of comparable size.' 6' The same is
true if the name of a city or locality in the United States, or the
name of a foreign country or locality other than the one in
which the article was produced, appears. 62 However, when
the letters "USA" are used as a symbol or decoration, and
would not reasonably be construed as an indication of country
of origin, this requirement does not apply.' 63
2. In a Conspicuous Place
This self-explanatory requirement has engendered few
disputes. Customs has ruled that marking on the underside of
the handle of a shut-off valve is not conspicuous,' 4 but that
marking of a sheathed knife blade is adequate when the sheath
normally would be removed before purchase. 165
154. 19 C.F.R. § 134.45(b) (1987).
155. Id.
156. T.D. 74-42, 8 Cust. B. & Dec. 78 (1974).
157. O.R.R. Ruling 720,289 (Aug. 25, 1972). This same ruling approved mark-
ing with the term "IMPRIME EN FRANCE."
158. C.S.D. 80-52, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 812 (1979).
159. C.S.D. 80-179, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 1032 (1980).
160. T.D. 74-208, 8 Cust. B. & Dec. 373 (1974).
161. 19 C.F.R. § 134.46 (1987).
162. Id.
163. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 712,013 (Jan. 16, 1980).
164. C.S.D. 84-69, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 1012, 1013 (1984).
165. C.S.D. 80-32, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 777, 778 (1979).
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3. Legibly, Indelibly, and Permanently
Customs recommends that this requirement be met by ap-
plying the mark during manufacture, suggesting that the coun-
try-of-origin mark on metal articles be die sunk, molded in, or
etched; on earthenware or chinaware that it be glazed; and on
paper articles that it be imprinted.166 The regulations require
a degree of permanence "sufficient to insure that in any rea-
sonably foreseeable circumstance, the marking shall remain on
the article (or its container) until it reaches the ultimate pur-
chaser unless it is deliberately removed. The marking must
survive normal distribution and store handling." 167 Paint sten-
cilling of ships' anchors, for example, is not acceptable because
weathering causes the paint to wear or become obscured by
rust. Anchors must be marked by die stamping, raised letter-
ing, or an equally permanent method. 68
B. Specific Products
The Tariff Act prescribes specific methods of marking for
certain articles, and authorizes Customs to prescribe specific
methods by regulation. 69 Customs has exercised its authority
to require that imported eyeglass and sunglass frames be
marked by die stamping in a contrasting color, by raised letter-
ing, by engraving, or by some other method producing a per-
manent mark; ink stamping and tagging with adhesive labels is
not permitted.' 7° Rotary cutting tools (drill bits) also must be
marked by means of die stamping in a contrasting color, by
raised lettering, by engraving, or by some other permanent
method-with narrowly drawn exceptions. 171
Broadly-based Congressionally-imposed marking require-
ments have not been without problems. A major problem oc-
curred with enactment of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
which required, inter alia, specific forms of marking for pipe
and tube, compressed gas cylinders, and manhole rings,
frames; covers, and assemblies. 72
166. 19 C.F.R. § 134.41(a) (1987).
167. Id. § 134.41(b) (1987).
168. T.D. 81-162, 15 Cust. B. & Dec. 410 (1981).
169. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1).
170. T.D. 74-38, 8 Cust. B. & Dec. 71 (1974).
171. T.D. 84-214, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 703 (1984).
172. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 207, 98 Stat. 2948,
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1. Pipe and Tube
Marking requirements for pipe and tube are an instance of
Congressional irresponsibility being overcome by a laudable
dose of sanity administered by the Customs Service. Section
207 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 required that pipes
and fittings of iron, steel, or stainless steel be marked with the
name of the country of origin in English by means of "die
stamping, cast-in-mold lettering, etching, or engraving." '173
This requirement presented a serious problem because, as
Customs stated, many of these products "cannot be marked by
any of the four prescribed methods without rendering such ar-
ticles unfit for the purpose for which they are intended or vio-
lating industry standards for such articles."'174 Cast-in-mold
lettering, of course, can be done only if pipe is cast, and most
pipe is not cast. But the other permitted means of labelling-
die stamping, etching, and engraving-all involve cutting into
the wall of the pipe, thereby reducing its thickness and its abil-
ity to withstand pressure from liquid or gas.
Customs dealt with the problem by creative, if questiona-
ble, statutory construction:
Under the laws of statutory construction, section 207 and
19 U.S.C. 1304, which it amends, should be read in pari
materia, so that pipe and pipe fittings which by their nature
will not permit marking by any of the four prescribed meth-
ods will not be barred from entering the U.S. Such a con-
struction would allow for alternative methods of marking,
such as stencilling or tagging in bundles.' 75
Accordingly, the alternative methods were permitted, section
207's apparent requirement to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.' 76 In an obscure provision of the monumental Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Congress ratified Customs' wisdom by
amending section 207. t77
2976 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1304(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1987)); Palme-
ter, supra note 44, at 542.
173. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 207, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1304(c) (West Supp.
1987).
174. 50 Fed. Reg. 1064-65 (1985) (approved Dec. 21, 1984).
175. T.D. 86-15, 20 Cust. B. & Dec. adv. sheet no. 7, at 3, 4, 51 Fed. Reg. 4559,
4560 (Jan. 22, 1986).
176. Id. at 4, 51 Fed. Reg. at 4560.
177. The amendment reads as follows:
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2. Compressed Gas Cylinders
Section 207 of the Trade and Tariff Act imposed the same
marking requirements on compressed gas cylinders as it did on
pipe and tube. 178  The same technical problems apparently
were not present, however, as the amendment essentially codi-
fied an existing ruling. 79
3. Manhole Rings, Frames, Covers, and Assemblies
These somewhat pedestrian products also were included
within section 207's scope, 80 presumably to aid them in their
competition with imports.' The four permitted methods of
marking apparently cause no technical problems.
4. Metal and Glass Instruments
The Tariff Act requires the familiar die stamping, cast-in-
mold lettering, etching or engraving as the method of marking
on articles such as knives, clippers, shears, safety razors, surgi-
cal instruments, scientific and laboratory instruments, pliers,
pincers, and vacuum containers.8 2
5. Watch, Clock, and Timing Devices
Detailed marking requirements are contained in the Tariff
Schedules for watch and clock movements, dials, and cases.183
If, because of the nature of an article, it is technically or commercially infea-
sible to mark it by one of the four methods specified in paragraph (1), the
article may be marked by an equally permanent method of marking such as
paint stenciling or, in the case of small diameter pipe, tube, and fittings, by
tagging the containers or bundles.
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1888(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2924 (codified at 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1304(c) (West Supp. 1987)).
178. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 207, 19 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (Supp. III 1985).
179. T.D. 81-268, 15 Cust. B. & Dec. 665 (1981).
180. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 207, 19 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (Supp. III 1985).
181. See, e.g., The Manhole Cover Is a Thing of Beauty to Howrah India-Alleyway In-
dustrialists Seek Their Fortunes in Capping the Sewers of America, Wall St.J., Nov. 29, 1984,
at 1, col. 4.
182. See T.D. 77-236, 11 Cust. B. & Dec. 435 (1977); 19 C.F.R. § 134.43(a)
(1987). Although section 134.43(a) states that this marking is "required by certain
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930," no provisions are cited, and none appear to be
included in the current version of that Act, as amended. The point is academic, how-
ever, as the agency has clear authority to impose the requirements by regulation. See
supra note 169 and accompanying text.
183. TSUSA Sched. 7, Part 2E, headnote 4.
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Regulations require that compliance be "exact" before im-
ports will be released by Customs. 8 4
6. Potted Plants, Traveler's Checks, and "Boogie Boards"
Examples of specific marking requirements are as varied
as the huge variety of articles that are imported. This survey
may conclude with three not altogether profound examples:
imported potted plants are considered a single product for
marking purposes (rather than a pot and a plant); "a stick
planted securely in the soil of a potted plant bearing the leg-
end 'Product of Canada' is considered to be an acceptable
method of country of origin marking.""'8 ' Traveler's Checks
are not articles for marking purposes; like currency, they are
intangible evidence of value. I8 6 And "Boogie Boards," which,
we are told, "serve the same purpose as surf boards-to ride
waves," may be marked "Handcrafted in Mexico" on the top
surface. 18 7
C. Exceptions and the 'J-List"
A number of exceptions are permitted to the marking re-
quirements of section 304, perhaps the chief exception being
the one that exempts an article if the marking of its container
"will reasonably indicate the origin" of the article to the ulti-
mate purchaser. 88 Thus, plugs to be installed in vehicular en-
gines, sold only in clearly marked containers, need not them-
selves be marked. 8 9 Similarly, price-marking labels and tags,
packaged in reels for sale to stores, need not be marked pro-
vided the container in which they reach the stores is properly
marked.190
The "J-List"-section 304(a)(3)(J)-exempts a specified
group of articles from individual marking, provided their con-
tainers are marked. These articles were those that had been
excluded from marking requirements in the two years follow-
ingJuly 1, 1937, that also were imported in substantial quanti-
184. 19 C.F.R. §§ 11.9, 134.43(b) (1987).
185. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 712,108 (Mar. 11, 1980).
186. C.S.D. 80-59, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 820, 821 (1979).
187. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 712,210 (Mar. 20, 1980).
188. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(D).
189. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 712,409 (Feb. 26, 1980).
190. C.S.D. 80-115, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 906 (1979).
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ties in the five years prior to January 1, 1937.' 9' They are set
forth in the Customs Regulations, and range from "Art, works
of" to "Wire, except barbed," with such products as buttons,
playing cards, tuning pins, and sponges in between. 92
Exceptions to the marking requirement also may be au-
thorized for articles:
- that are incapable of being marked;' 93
- that cannot be marked prior to shipment without in-
jury;194
- that cannot be marked except at an expense that prohibits
their importation;' 9 5
- that are a crude substance;' 9
6
- that are imported for use by the importer and are not in-
tended for resale;' 9 7
- that are to be processed by the importer for its own ac-
count in a way that necessarily would obliterate the mark by
processing which is not utilized for the purpose of conceal-
ing origin;' 9s
- whose country of origin necessarily is known to the ulti-
mate purchaser;' 99
- that were produced more than twenty years before impor-
tation;2 00
- that cannot be marked after importation except at prohib-
itive expense, and failure to mark before importation was
not an attempt to avoid compliance.2 0 '
191. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(J).
192. 19 C.F.R. § 134.33 (1987).
193. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A). Thus, carburetor adjustment needles are too
small to be marked; however, their containers must be marked. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
713,261 (Oct. 27, 1980).
194. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(B).
195. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(C).
196. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(E).
197. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(F).
198. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(G).
199. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(H).
200. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(I).
201. Id. § 1304(a)(3)(K). In addition, Customs by regulation exempts articles
entered or withdrawn from warehouse for immediate exportation or for transporta-
tion and exportation; products of American fisheries which are duty free; products of
possessions of the United States; products of the United States exported and re-
turned; and personal articles exempt from duty. See 19 C.F.R. § 134.32 (j)-(n)
(1987).
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D. Repackaged Imports
Allegations of misleading repackaging of imported articles
led Customs to amend its regulations in 1984 to require mark-
ing of articles that are repackaged after importation.2 0 2 It was
contended, for example, that properly marked imported hand
tools had been repackaged in "blister packs" in the United
States, with the marked side of the tool face down in the
pack.20 3
To insure against this kind of practice, Customs added a
regulation requiring the importer to certify, at the time of im-
portation, that it will not obscure or conceal the mark upon
repackaging and, if the article is to be sold or transferred to a
subsequent repackager, the importer shall notify that person,
in writing, of the marking requirements. 4 This regulation ap-
plies as well to articles, themselves exempt from marking, that
are imported in properly marked bulk containers and are re-
packaged in retail containers.2 5
E. Blended and Commingled Products
A number of recent rulings have dealt with the question of
the blending or commingling of products without substantial
transformation after their importation. Blending and commin-
gling do not exempt these products from the marking require-
ments, although a "major supplier" rule developed by Cus-
toms has ameliorated some of the practical problems that the
requirement may pose.
The central case involves honey, which is imported in bulk
from several countries and blended to achieve a high degree of
uniformity in taste and appearance.20 6 Foreign sources of
honey for the blends change rapidly. A requirement that every
country contributing to a blend be listed could have the effect
of forcing importers to concentrate on larger, more consistent
suppliers (to minimize proliferation of labels) and to halt im-
202. T.D. 84-127, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 324, 326 (1984).
203. Id. at 325; see also C.S.D. 83-77, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 892 (1983); C.S.D. 83-
78, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 893 (1983); C.S.D. 83-79, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 894 (1983).
204. 19 C.F.R. § 134.26 (1987).
205. C.S.D. 84-44, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 946 (1984).
206. Id. In the case of honey, and the other products involved in this issue, the
marking requirement applies to the container and not to the article itself, which, if it
were capable of being marked, would avoid the issue.
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ports from smaller, more sporadic suppliers. To avoid this re-
suit, Customs ruled that only the "major" foreign suppliers
contributing to the blends need be listed. A similar policy has
been adopted for orange juice produced from imported con-
20centrate. 07 Similarly, containers of commingled imported
nuts, bolts, and washers ("J-List" articles exempt from mark-
ing) may be labeled:
This package contains articles from one or more countries,
including the following: (list of major source countries in
order of percentage contribution to a distributor's overall
stock) or (Japan, Taiwan, Canada, Korea, and China).2 °8
F. American Goods Returned
Products of the United States exported and returned are
exempt from the marking requirements of section 304.209 This
exception applies even if minor processing has occurred.2 1 0
However, articles assembled abroad from Americanzmade
components2 1' are considered products of the country of as-
sembly for marking purposes, and must be marked "'Assem-
bled in [name of country] from material of U.S. origin,' or a
similar phrase. 21 2
When a U.S. product is exported and returned after
processing that does not amount to substantial transformation,
the issue arises as to whether it may be marked "Made in (For-
eign Country)" or "Made in U.S.A." The answer is neither.
Because a substantial transformation has not taken place, it
would be misleading to claim the foreign country as the coun-
try of origin. On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion holds that the claim "Made in U.S.A." constitutes an af-
207. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 729,523 (May 1, 1986); C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 729,410
(Mar. 19, 1986).
208. C.S.D. 84-56, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 983, 985 (1984) (emphasis in original).
209. 19 C.F.R. § 134.32(M) (1987).
210. "Imported articles which consist solely of American-made components af-
fixed in a minor assembly process in a foreign country that does not substantially
transform the American-made components are excepted from marking requirements
as American goods exported and returned." C.S.D. 79-381, 13 Cust. B. & Dec. 1570,
1571 (1979).
211. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
212. 19 C.F.R. §. 10.22 (1987). Thus, automotive lamps assembled in Mexico
from components of United States and Canadian or Taiwanese origin are, for mark-
ing purposes, of Mexican origin. C.S.D. 80-21, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 758, 759 (1980).
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firmative representation that the entire product is of domestic
origin; thus, when a part of an article is of foreign origin, "it
would be improper to mark a product 'Made in U.S.A.' "21
Presumably, it would be permissible to label the goods as
"Product of U.S.A., Processed in (Foreign Country)." This is
similar to the required disclosure for articles assembled abroad
from American-made components, is permitted in similar cir-
cumstances involving two foreign countries, and is consistent
with the consumer-notification purpose of the law. 14
G. Failure to Mark and False Marking
A number of statutes are potentially applicable when mer-
chandise is not marked or when it is falsely marked. Section
304 provides for an additional 10% duty for failure to mark in
accordance with its requirements. 21 5  Improperly marked
goods will not be delivered, and already released goods may be
subject to notice of redelivery. t6 Alteration or removal of a
country of origin marking is punishable by fine or imprison-
ment.217
False statements, or even negligently erroneous state-
ments concerning origin, could subject an importer to the se-
vere civil penalties of section 592 of the Tariff Act. 218  For
fraud, the penalty may be equal to the total domestic value of
213. C.S.D. 80-15, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 749, 750 (1980): Surgical instruments
exported for further manufacturing processes that do not amount to substantial
transformation are, upon reimportation, exempt from marking as products of the
United States exported and returned, but may not be marked "Made in U.S.A." con-
trary to FTC requirements. See also 77 F.T.C. 1760: "Made in U.S.A." affirmatively
represents that a product was made in its entirety in the United States.
214. C.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 712,995 (June 27, 1980) ("Product of Mexico,
Processed in Canada" acceptable where Canadian operations do not amount to sub-
stantial transformation).
215. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(f) (Supp. III 1985). Payment of the duty does not relieve
the importer from the obligation to mark after importation; there is no option to pay
the duty and avoid the marking. Globemaster, Inc. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 974
(Cust. Ct. 1970); see Note, The Tariff Law-No Option to Import Without Marking, 12
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 596 (1973).
216. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(g) (Supp. III 1985); 19 C.F.R. § 134.3 (1987).
217. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(h) (Supp. III 1985).
218. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1982). See Kennedy, Civil Penalty Proceedings Under Section
592 of the Tarif Act of 1930, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 147 (1987); Peterson, Civil Customs
Penalties Under Section 592 of the Tariff Act: Current Practice and the Need for Further Reform,
18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679 (1985).
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the merchandise," 9 while for gross negligence it may amount
to 40%,22 and for negligence 20%, of the domestic value of
the merchandise.2 '
Traditional Customs policy in enforcing section 592 has
been, "Shoot first, ask questions later," that is, seize and hold
the entire shipment of merchandise, and then, in a more lei-
surely fashion, consider the monetary penalty. This policy be-
came too much for Congress, which, in 1978, completely re-
vamped section 592 and curbed many of Customs' powers.2 2
Customs chafed under the new restraints, however, and was
widely perceived as frustrating the intent of Congress in their
implementation.223
Customs no longer needs to frustrate the intent of Con-
gress in implementing section 592. It has a new weapon,
which Congress clearly intended for other purposes, but which
Customs intends to use more generally against importers. Sec-
tion 3123(c) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provides,
"Any merchandise that is introduced or attempted to be intro-
duced into the United States contrary to law (other than in vio-
lation of section 592) may be seized and forfeited.1 22 4 The ex-
clusion of section 592 matters from the ambit of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act seems clear, but Customs reads the provision differ-
ently. In a Directive to the ports, Customs Headquarters has
stated that the section 592 exclusion will be read narrowly to
cover primarily situations involving duty rates or appraised
value. 2 25  For other matters-presumably including marking
matters-the authority of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act will be used
to seize "[m]erchandise introduced or attempted to be intro-
duced into the United States contrary to any law enforced by
Customs. ' 226 Thus, Customs can frustrate the intent of Con-
219. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(1).
220. Id. § 1592(c)(2).
221. Id. § 1592(c)(3).
222. Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-410, § 110(a), 92 Stat. 888, 893-97 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1592
(1982)).
223. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 218; Peterson, supra note 218.
224. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3123, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-87 (codified at 19
U.S.C.A. § 1595a(c) (West Supp. 1987)).
225. Guidelines for Penalties and Seizures Under 19 U.S.C. 1592 and 19 U.S.C. 1595a,
Customs Directive No. 4400-03 (Mar. 27, 1987).
226. Id. at 3.
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gress in implementing yet another statute, and, in the process,
side-step entirely the substantive and procedural safeguards
placed in section 592 by Congress in 1978.
CONCLUSION
In its administration of the marking requirements of sec-
tion 304, the Customs Service has imaginatively and properly
discharged its responsibility of insuring adequate consumer
notification without imposing impossible burdens on exporters
and importers. Development of the "major supplier" rule for
blended and commingled products is evidence of this, as are
the pipe and tube marking requirements administered in the
wake of those imposed by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
But if Customs in its administration of the marking statute
has served the cause of consumer protection well, the same
cannot be said of its adminstration of other segments of the
rules of origin. Its more recent country of origin determina-
tions smack more of protectionism than of consumer protec-
tion, as the agency contorts, gyrates, and twists its way to one
restrictive ruling after another. Thus, we are told, in the pre-
amble to the textile rules of origin, that there should be only
one rule for all purposes. 22 7 Then, in Yuri Fashions, Customs
argued-successfully-that there may be one rule of origin for
marking and another for quotas, "awkward" though that might
be.228 Next, in an administrative ruling restricting imports of
sweaters from New Zealand, Customs informed us that there is
but one law-"the law"-"to be applied in all country of origin
decisions. 212 9 Simultaneously, the agency was arguing to the
Court of International Trade that when a steel quota is in-
volved, the transformation "must be more substantial than"
otherwise. 3 o
To this on-again and off-again jurisprudence, we must add
such rulings as those holding that threading is substantial
transformation if it means GSP benefits will be denied, but not
if it means that a quota will be inapplicable 2 3 ' and that wire is
227. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
230. See Ferrostaal Metals Corp. v. United States, Slip Op. No. 87-76, at 10 (Ct.
Int'l Trade June 26, 1987).
23 1. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
1987]
50 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 11:1
very different from wire rod if a higher duty can be extracted,
but not if the country of origin will change. 32
This situation has developed because of the enormous
stakes that can be at issue in country of origin rulings: from
significant duty differentials if an article qualifies for GSP or
CBI duty-free treatment or avoids Column 2 rates, to importa-
tion itself when quotas are applicable. These stakes have
thrust the Customs Service into the spotlight in ways that sim-
ple marking rulings have not. The agency finds itself between
exporters and importers who seek to qualify for favorable duty
treatment and to avoid quotas and their domestic competitors
who seek the opposite. The domestic competitors, however,
have powerful congressional allies who are not shy in making
their preferences known. The results of this congressional
pressure, unfortunately, are reflected in the trend of the rul-
ings in recent years. The pressure should be resisted by the
agency, and-perhaps in a world more ideal than that in which
we live-should not be applied by Congress in the first place.
Rules of origin serve many legitimate and important purposes
in our trade and customs laws. Protectionism is not one of
them, nor should it be.
232. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
